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ABSTRACT 
The transportation system is rapidly evolving with new connected and automated 
vehicle (CAV) technologies that integrate CAVs with other vehicles and roadside 
infrastructure to form a transportation cyber-physical system (TCPS). Through 
connectivity, CAVs affect their environments and vice versa, increasing the size of the 
cyberattack surface and the risk of exploitation of security vulnerabilities by malicious 
actors. Thus, a greater understanding of potential CAV-TCPS cyber-attacks and of ways 
to prevent them is a high priority. Moreover, making the CAV navigate safely in an 
unexpected environment is a critical safety requirement. Considering the safety while 
maintaining the in-vehicle security is the focus of this study, where first, in part 1, the 
author explores the CAV safety through machine learning models, more specifically deep 
neural network, to help the vehicle to navigate safely in an unexpected environment, which 
is required for real-world deployment and has not been fully explored by researchers and 
industries. In part 2, the author developed a connected vehicle application development 
platform (CVDeP), such that developers can develop and validate the CAV safety and 
mobility applications in a controlled and real-world connected vehicle testbed. Our study 
shows that applications developed through the platform meet the safety requirements of 
connected vehicle applications.  
Later, in part 3, the author explores the in-vehicle security aspect, where the author 
leverages the state-of-the-art cloud supported quantum computers to classify in-vehicle 
cyberattacks, more specifically amplitude shift attacks. The author develop the quantum-
classical hybrid neural network to detect amplitude shift in-vehicle cyberattack. This study 
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integrates the digital infrastructure and a CAV’s in-vehicle system, where the author has 
shown the potential of using a combination of quantum and classical neural network to 
improve the cyberattack detection accuracy compared to classical neural network and 
quantum neural network alone.  
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VISION-BASED NAVIGATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES IN ROADWAY 
ENVIRONMENTS WITH UNEXPECTED HAZARDS 
 
Introduction 
Vision-based navigation of autonomous vehicles primarily depends on the Deep 
Neural Network (DNN) based systems in which the controller obtains input from 
sensors/detectors, such as cameras and produces a vehicle control output, such as a steering 
wheel angle to navigate the vehicle safely in a roadway traffic environment. Typically, 
these DNN-based systems of the autonomous vehicle are trained through supervised 
learning; however, recent studies show that a trained DNN-based system can be 
compromised by perturbation or adversarial inputs. Similarly, this perturbation can be 
introduced into the DNN-based systems of autonomous vehicles by unexpected roadway 
hazards, such as debris and roadblocks. In this study, the author first introduces a roadway 
hazardous environment (both intentional and unintentional roadway hazards) that can 
compromise the DNN-based navigational system of an autonomous vehicle, and produces 
an incorrect steering wheel angle, which can cause crashes resulting in fatality and injury. 
Then, the author develops a DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system using object 
detection and semantic segmentation to mitigate the adverse effect of this type of hazardous 
environment, which helps the autonomous vehicle to navigate safely around such hazards. 
The author find that our developed DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system 
including hazardous object detection and semantic segmentation improves the navigational 
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ability of an autonomous vehicle to avoid a potential hazard by 21% compared to the 
traditional DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system (Islam et al. 2019).  
According to the 2016 American automobile association report, 50,658 crashes 
occurred in the U.S. from the year 2011 to 2014 due to debris resulting in 9,805 injuries 
and 125 deaths annually (Tefft 2016). The roadway hazards, such as debris, are considered 
to be non-fixed and unexpected objects on the travel or driving lane of the roadway and 
include objects that have fallen from vehicles or have come from construction sites or 
littering. Given that the autonomous vehicle is considered the future of surface 
transportation, its ability to detect debris or hazards and then navigate safely around them 
is crucial for avoiding potential crashes. Recently, such a navigational task has been 
accomplished using Deep Neural Network (DNN). Typically, an autonomous vehicle 
perceives its surrounding roadway environment using sensors, and the software running in 
the vehicle determines the action to be taken based on the input from the sensors. Several 
types of sensors, such as vision-based sensors (e.g., Cameras), LIDAR, and Radar are 
currently available for the perception task. Due to the cost-effectiveness of the vision-based 
sensor compared to the other types of sensors (e.g., LIDAR and Radar),  vision-based 
navigation becomes an attractive solution for autonomous vehicles (Bertozzi, Broggi, and 
Fascioli 2000)(Dagan et al. 2004)(Tatarek, Kronenberger, and Handmann 2017). 
The recent development of DNNs, in particular, Convolutional Neural Network 
(CNN)(Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012), has improved vision-based navigation 
for autonomous vehicles significantly. After being trained and tested using a dataset 
collected by sensors, these CNN models are then deployed in autonomous vehicles to 
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navigate the vehicle safely. For example, during training, the CNN-based end-to-end 
driving model maps a relationship between the driving behavior of humans using roadway 
images collected from cameras and the steering wheel angle (Yang et al. 2018)(Bojarski et 
al. 2016). Thus, the performance of autonomous vehicles primarily depends on the training 
dataset, meaning if a hazard that the CNN model is not trained on appears on the roadway, 
the autonomous vehicle driving model may produce an incorrect steering wheel angle and 
may cause a crash. A recent study shows that the autonomous vehicle navigation system 
may fail to navigate safely due to several reasons, such as Radar sensor failure, camera 
sensor failure, and software failure (Bhavsar et al. 2017). This study addresses the situation 
where a well-trained driving model may fail due to unexpected hazards that may lead to 
unsafe navigation, and then explores the use of object detection and semantic segmentation 
(Yao, Fidler, and Urtasun 2012) for mitigating the navigational problem in this hazardous 
condition. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The related work section 
explores the existing studies on autonomous vehicle navigation, state-of-art DNN-based 
autonomous vehicle driving models, and the limitations of the traditional DNN-based 
model. Then the author introduces the method developed in this study for navigating an 
autonomous vehicle on a roadway with unexpected hazards. Furthermore, the author  
validate our proposed method using three case studies: (i) a model trained using a dataset 
that includes hazards but without considering them as separate input features; (ii) a model 
trained on a dataset that considers hazards as separate input features and uses a distance 
measurement sensor and image segmentation; (iii) a model trained on a dataset that 
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considers hazards as separate input features and only uses image segmentation. In the 
second and third case studies, the author introduces a DNN-based autonomous vehicle 
driving system to enhance the ability of an autonomous vehicle to navigate safely in a 
hazardous environment. Then the author presents the experimental setup employed in this 
study. After that, the author evaluates all the case scenarios and report the results obtained 
through our experiments, and finally, the author discusses the conclusions and suggest the 
areas for future work.  
Related work 
This section reviews the previous research on hazard detection, the DNN-based 
driving systems used in an autonomous vehicle, and the techniques for and the importance 
of object detection and image segmentation in addition to the limitations of using DNN in 
autonomous vehicles.  
DNN-based Autonomous Vehicle Driving Model  
DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving systems are rapidly evolving (Bojarski et 
al. 2016)(Pomerleau 1989). Not only software companies such as Waymo (Google) Uber, 
and Lyft are using the DNN-based systems for autonomous vehicles, but many car 
companies such as Tesla, Volvo, BMW, and Ford are currently working on DNN-based 
autonomous vehicles driving systems (Zhang et al. 2018). In such systems, sensors like 
cameras, LIDAR, and Radar provide input to DNN models, such as Convolutional Neural 
Network (CNN)(Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012) or Recurrent Neural Network 
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(RNN) (Mnih et al. 2015), which then produce outputs such as steering wheel angle and 
velocity. For example, the autonomous vehicle architecture developed by NVIDIA, named 
DAVE-2, uses a CNN model which takes input from a camera and outputs a steering wheel 
commands for navigation (Bojarski et al. 2016), while Udacity autonomous vehicle driving 
architectures include both CNN-based (e.g., Autumn) and RNN-based (e.g., Chauffeur 
using CNN and RNN) (“Udacity Self Driving Car,” n.d.). This study used a CNN-based 
driving model similar to DAVE-2 as it is the fundamental base of DNN-based autonomous 
vehicle systems.  
DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving systems, which are intrinsically software 
systems, can be error-prone and cause severe consequences if they do not function as 
intended. Several studies have shown the vulnerabilities of the existing DNN models 
(Carlini and Wagner 2017)(Papernot, McDaniel, et al. 2016)(Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 
2018)(Papernot, Mcdaniel, et al. 2016). For example, DNN-based image classification can 
be exploited by adding a small perturbation to an input image such that the DNN model 
misclassifies it as another category, a vulnerability recently confirmed by (Eykholt et al. 
2017), which found that attackers can physically modify objects using a low-cost technique 
to cause classification errors in DNN-based vision systems. These perturbations can be 
introduced under widely varying distances, angles, and resolutions. For example, in 
(Eykholt et al. 2017) perturbations caused a DNN model to interpret a subtly modified 
physical stop sign as a speed limit of 45 mph sign. Similarly, the debris or roadblocks on 
the road can also compromise the autonomous vehicle driving system by producing 
incorrect steering wheel angles, potentially causing a fatal collision. These limitations 
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prompted this study to evaluate the impact of unexpected hazardous environments on a 
DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system.   
Autonomous Vehicle Dataset  
Data are an important part of deep learning-based systems, and this study requires 
a dataset that supports (i) end-to-end driving systems (input: image; output: steering wheel 
angle), (ii) image segmentation, and (iii) hazard detection. To find an appropriate one, the 
author explores various existing datasets used by the autonomous vehicle community. The 
closest dataset is provided by Udacity, which supports end-to-end data and image 
segmentation, but it does not provide the ground truth for hazards in the drivable lane 
(“Udacity Self Driving Car,” n.d.). KTTI (Geiger et al. 2013) and Cityscape (Cordts et al. 
2016) datasets also do not support hazard detection as ground truth data. The dataset 
matching our requirements the closest is the Lost and Found dataset (Pinggera et al. 2016), 
which contains the image as the input, and the yaw rate (angular velocity), but not the 
steering wheel angle required by this study, as an output. Since existing datasets do not 
fully meet our needs, after careful consideration, the author created our dataset using 
simulation as described in the experimental setup section. 
DNN-based Object Detection and Segmentation 
Object detection and classification are core components of autonomous driving. By 
detecting and classifying the objects, the autonomous vehicle controller determines safe 
navigation for both path planning and route planning. If an autonomous vehicle is not able 
to detect unexpected hazards on the road, it will not be able to navigate safely, perhaps 
resulting in a crash. However, detecting these objects or hazards is a challenging task. 
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While various sensors, such as Radar and LIDAR, can be used for accurate distance and 
velocity measurement, these sensors are relatively costly than camera sensors (Pinggera et 
al. 2016). Considering these limitations, vision-based sensors, such as cameras, are being 
used on autonomous vehicles for the navigational task. With the recent development of 
DNNs, DNN-based object detection and semantic segmentation can be applied to detect 
these roadway hazards, making navigation of autonomous vehicles safer.  
Semantic segmentation is a technology that has been widely used in the computer 
vision area to divide an unknown image into different parts (Guo et al. 2018), can be 
applied to an image containing unknown objects. This technology is effective in providing 
the scenario depicted by an image, allowing the DNN to capture additional information 
about the dataset during training. There are three major types of semantic segmentation 
technologies: Region-based semantic segmentation (Caesar, Uijlings, and Ferrari 
2016)(Girshick et al. 2014), Fully Convolutional Network (FCN)-based semantic 
segmentation (Long, Shelhamer, and Darrell 2015)(Eigen and Fergus 2015)(Liu, Guo, and 
Lew 2017) and Weakly-Supervised semantic segmentation (Dai, He, and Sun 
2015)(Papandreou et al. 2015)(Khoreva et al. 2017). The region-based semantic 
segmentation provides segmentation based on the results of object detection, meaning it 
can be developed on any CNN model. The FCN-based semantic segmentation segments 
each pixel of the image, meaning it does not require extracting regions of the image and, 
thus, can be applied to arbitrary sizes of images. The weakly supervised semantic 
segmentation technology, which was developed to reduce the labeling cost of a large 
dataset (Khoreva et al. 2017), achieves semantic segmentation by exploiting annotated 
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bounding boxes or image-level labels. While recent studies show that segmentation-based 
navigation can improve navigational performance (Eraqi, Moustafa, and Honer 
2017)(Teichmann et al. 2016)(Siam et al. 2018), none considers the navigation of 
autonomous vehicles in hazardous environments. Thus, by leveraging these DNN-based 
models, the author can detect hazards and then extract their semantic information from 
images obtained from the camera sensor of an autonomous vehicle.  The approach adopted 
in this study uses an FCN-based model as one such network is relatively small, yet the 
network yields fast results (Long, Shelhamer, and Darrell 2015). To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first work that develops a DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving 
system focusing on unexpected roadway hazardous environments. 
Method 
In this section, the author  describe our approach for developing a safer autonomous 
vehicle driving system in a hazardous environment. This study uses DNN-based object 
detection and segmentation to create a corrected image, which is subsequently used by the 
autonomous vehicle driving system to predict the steering wheel angle. As presented in 
Figure 1. 1, the author develops a DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system, which 
comprises three DNN models. The first one is the DNN-based hazard detection and 
segmentation model, which detects the hazard and creates a segmented image. The second 
model is the hazard analysis and avoidance model, which fuses the segmented image with 
the original input image from the dashboard camera to make the autonomous vehicle 
driving model aware of the unexpected roadway hazards.  This model then analyzes the 
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hazard and determines if the hazard should be ignored or considered as a threat for a 
potential crash using a threat factor (𝑇𝑓). The third model is the DNN-based autonomous 
vehicle driving model, which takes the fused image with hazard information and produces 
the steering wheel angle required to navigate the vehicle safely in an unexpected hazardous 
environment. The author provided a detailed description of these three models in the 
following subsections. 
 
Figure 1. 1 DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system in an unexpected 
hazardous environment (Islam et al. 2019).  
DNN-based hazard detection and segmentation model  
For hazard detection and image segmentation, this study uses an FCN, which is a 
DNN-based image object detection and segmentation model (Long, Shelhamer, and Darrell 
2015). Figure 1. 2 shows the structure of the FCN network used in our study. It takes an 
input of image size 400x600x3 and outputs a segmented image of the same size. The author  
uses a pre-trained network with a weight of VGGNet (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014), 
which is a deep convolutional network for large-scale image recognition, and then the 
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author  re-trained the model with our training dataset to classify the hazard and perform 
image segmentation. 
 
Figure 1. 2 FCN-based object detection and image segmentation model used in this 
study (Islam et al. 2019). 
 
Hazard analysis and avoidance model 
As shown in Figure 1. 1, the image captured from the center dashboard camera first 
goes to the hazard detection and segmentation model, which provides an output of the 
detected object in addition to a segmented image. Then, this output is combined with the 
original image in the hazard analysis and avoidance model. In this study, the author 
developed a hazard analysis and avoidance model based on the following equation:  
𝐼 = (1 − 𝑇𝑓) × 𝐼𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 + 𝑇𝑓  ×  𝐼𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 
where 𝐼 is the image used to predict the autonomous vehicle driving model; 
𝐼𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 is the data from the center dashboard camera of the vehicle; 𝐼𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 is the 
segmented image of  𝐼𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  containing the hazardous object detected and segmented; 
and 𝑇𝑓 is the threat value of the detected hazardous object or physical-world threat object. 
This threat value depends on the position of a detected object on a driving lane. If the object 
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is dangerous to the autonomous vehicle, it will have a high threat factor, while a negligible 
threat object will have a lower threat factor. This threat value depends on the longitudinal 
and latitudinal distance from the autonomous vehicle. Depending on the hazardous object 
localization technique, the author has used two procedures to determine the threat value: 
(ii) Procedure 1 - threat value determination using a distance measurement sensor (e.g., 
Radar); and (ii) Procedure 2 – threat value determination using image segmentation.  
Procedure 1 - threat value determination using a distance measurement sensor  
According to the first procedure, the author measures the longitudinal distance (𝑙𝑥), 
and latitudinal distance (𝑙𝑦) of hazardous objects from the vehicle using a distance 
measurement sensor. If the vehicle is moving forward (longitudinal movement) or steering 
towards (latitudinal movement) the hazard the value of 𝑙𝑥 and 𝑙𝑦 decreases, respectively, 
and hence the hazard poses a higher threat of colliding with the vehicle. The author 
considers the hazard as a threat to the vehicle if the hazard is within the longitudinal 
distance, 𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥 and latitudinal distance, 𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥. In our study, the author uses the Radar 
sensor to measure the longitudinal distance and the latitudinal distance, and the author  
measures the threat value using the following equations:  
 
𝑇 = √(










𝑇𝑓 =  {
𝑇 − 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛
               𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑦 ≤  𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥 ; 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑥 ≤  𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥




where, 𝑇𝑓 is the threat value corresponding to the hazardous object; 𝑙𝑥  and 𝑙𝑦 are 
the longitudinal distance and latitudinal distance in centimeters (cm) to the detected hazard 
from the vehicle, respectively; 𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the maximum longitudinal distance and 
maximum latitudinal distance, correspondingly, to consider the hazard as a threat; and 𝑇 is 
the threat value calculated from the longitudinal and the latitudinal distance. Then, the 
value of  𝑇 is normalized using the Min-Max normalization technique to obtain a value 
between 0 to +1 to determine the final threat value, 𝑇𝑓 (Suarez-Alvarez et al. 2012)(“About 
Feature Scaling and Normalization” n.d.). In our experiment, the author has selected 𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥  
as 6000cm as this is the Radar’s maximum range of finding an object in our experimental 
setup, and 𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥 is selected as 370 cm, which is the standard lane width of a roadway. The 
author can visualize the relationship between the threat value, and longitudinal and 
latitudinal distance in Figure 1. 3.  
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Figure 1. 3 Heatmap for the threat value based on the longitudinal and latitudinal 
distance of a hazardous object using Radar sensor data (Islam et al. 2019). 
Procedure 2 – threat value determination using image segmentation  
In this procedure, instead of using a Radar sensor, the author used the segmented 
image to calculate the threat value. In this way, the author can eliminate the use of any 
sensor data besides the camera video feed. After the image segmentation, the author gets 
the image coordinates (𝑥, 𝑦) of the hazard. As the camera is located at the center dashboard 
of the vehicle facing the front roadway, the author measures the relative distance of the 
hazardous object in the image of size (ℎ, 𝑤), from the bottom center pixel, (ℎ, 𝑤
2
) to quantify 
the threat. The author calculates the threat based on the location of the hazard in the 
segmented image using the following equation: 
𝑇𝑓 = 1 −  √








 where, 𝑇𝑓 is the threat value corresponding to the hazardous object located in the 
segmented image at location (𝑥, 𝑦) pixels, where (𝑥, 𝑦) is the pixel value closest to the 
bottom center pixel, (ℎ, 𝑤
2
), of the image. The value of ℎ and 𝑤 indicates the height and 
width of the image, respectively. As the camera of the vehicle is located at the center of 
the vehicle facing the front roadway, the author subtracts ℎ and 𝑤
2
 values from the 𝑥 and 𝑦 
values, respectively, to obtain the longitudinal and latitudinal distance of the hazard relative 
to the front center of the vehicle. As the author described the equation above, the author 
calculates the threat value. The author can visualize the threat value in Figure 1. 4, where 
the threat value decreases as the object moves from the center bottom pixel of the image. 
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Figure 1. 4 Heatmap for the threat value based on the location of hazard using pixel 
value from the segmented image (Islam et al. 2019). 
DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving model   
In our study, the author  have implemented an autonomous vehicle driving model 
similar to DAVE-2, an end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model (Bojarski et al. 
2016). As shown in Figure 1. 5, the network receives an input image of 400x600x3 pixels 
and produces a steering wheel angle as an output. This network includes one lambda layer, 
one normalization layer, five convolution layers (Conv2D), and four fully connected (FC) 
layers. The author has used a 5x5 kernel (i.e., filters) and 2x2 stride (i.e., the increment of 
kernel movement) in the first 3 Conv2D layers, and a 1x1 stride and a 3x3 kernel in the 
last two Conv2D layers. The entire network contains 7,970,619 trainable parameters.  
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Figure 1. 5 CNN-based end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model used in this 
study (Islam et al. 2019). 
 
The author trains our driving model of an autonomous vehicle from the output of 
the hazard analysis and avoidance model followed by the deployment to test the 
performance. After the training, our trained autonomous vehicle driving model is aware of 
hazardous objects on the roadway and produces a steering wheel angle to navigate safely 
around the hazard. 
Experimental setup 
In the experimental setup, the author describes the data collection method, data 
preparation, and data augmentation; and finally, the author trains and validates the DNN-
based autonomous vehicle driving model. The steps of our experiment setup are as follows:    
Data Collection 
For this study, the author has used the robotics simulation platform Webots 
(Cyberbotics Ltd. 2013) to create the roadway environment with hazardous objects and to 
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collect the data including the driving attributes of the camera image, timestamp, location, 
vehicle speed, and steering wheel angle. The following subsections describe the collection 
procedure of the dataset.    
Roadway Environment Setup  
The roadway built in the simulation consists of two lanes in each direction and 
1663m in length with 16 curves (having 45 degrees to 90 degrees radius of curvature) and 
two intersections as shown in Figure 1. 6. Six additional non-autonomous vehicles are 
placed randomly on the roadway. The hazardous debris, which includes five objects: rocks, 
wooden boxes, oil barrels, wooden pallets, and sections of pipe are created in Webots 
(Cyberbotics Ltd. 2013) and placed randomly on the roadway as shown in Figure 1. 6. 
 
 
Figure 1. 6 Roadway environment setup for an autonomous vehicle with hazardous 
objects (Islam et al. 2019). 
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Autonomous Vehicle Setup  
For collecting the data, the autonomous vehicle is equipped with three dashboard 
cameras, a front, left and right camera (as shown in Figure 1. 7), and a Radar sensor. The 
data collected using these cameras are used to train the end-to-end autonomous vehicle 
driving model. For example, as seen in Figure 1. 8, the images collected by the left and 
right camera differ from the center camera. After training, the autonomous vehicle uses 
only a single front camera to navigate through the roadway, similar to the DAVE-2 system 
(Bojarski et al. 2016). In our developed driving model, the author used the Delphi ESR 
Radar sensor, which is commercially used in the existing autonomous vehicles 
(AutonomouStuff 2013). The author used the medium-range mode configurations 
(horizontal field of view of 90 degrees and a maximum range of 6000 cm) of the Radar 
sensor in our autonomous vehicle (“Webots Documentation: Radar Sensors” n.d.).  The 
author has also equipped the vehicle with three other Radar sensors in three directions (left, 
right, and back side) for monitoring the near-by traffic condition and vehicles. These 
Radars sensors are also configured in the medium range mode.  
 
Figure 1. 7 Camera placements in the autonomous vehicle (left, center, and right 
cameras) (Islam et al. 2019). 
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Figure 1. 8 Example of images collected by the three cameras in the autonomous 
vehicle (left, center, and right camera images (from left to right)) (Islam et al. 2019) 
Data Preparation 
After collecting the data, the author prepares the image dataset for training the end-
to-end driving model by normalizing and resizing. As shown in Figure 1. 9, the steering 
wheel angle output is normalized between the values of -0.5 and +0.5, where a positive 
value indicates the steering to the right, and a negative value represents steering to the left 
using linear transformation following this equation:  
𝜃𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑  =  −0.5 + max (0,  min (1.0 ,
𝜃𝑟𝑎𝑤− 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 −  𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛
))  
where, 𝜃𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 is the normalized steering angle between -0.5 and +0.5; 𝜃𝑟𝑎𝑤 is 
the actual steering wheel angle (in radians) measured from the vehicle; 𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥  and 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛 are 
the maximum and minimum steering wheel angle, respectively. The author  also normalize 
the input images for training, which is necessary to improve the DNN model performance 
(Zha et al. 2015). Normalization is also done on the input images. The red, green, and blue 
(RGB) channel values of the input images are normalized between the values of -1.0 and 
+1.0, and their top 200 pixels are cropped using a Lambda layer (as shown Figure 1. 10) 
as the top portion of the image is not necessary to predict the steering wheel angle and 
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doing so does not impact the steering wheel angle output of the driving model. For all data 
collected, the author  used an online image annotation tool, LabelMe (Russell et al. 2008), 
for labeling the hazardous object and segmented image. Using this tool, the author has 
created the ground truth data for training the image segmentation model for detecting and 
segmenting the hazards in an image. 
 
Figure 1. 9 Example of a normalized steering wheel angle plot from the training 
dataset (Islam et al. 2019). 
 
Figure 1. 10 Example of an original and cropped image in the training dataset (Islam 
et al. 2019). 
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Data Augmentation 
To obtain satisfactory performance from the driving model, it is necessary to train 
the model on multiple training datasets. Using the techniques of data augmentation, the 
author created additional data from the existing data through affine transformation (Tian et 
al. 2017), specifically random rotation, random brightness change, and horizontal flipping 
of the images, to double the size of the dataset as shown in Table 1. 1.  From our first 
simulation, the author has collected 1390 images in total, and the author has split the image 
dataset in training (i.e., 1112 images) and validation dataset (i.e., 278 images) as shown in 
column 2 of Table 1. 1. Then the author has doubled the dataset size (i.e., 2780 images) 
using data augmentation as presented in column 3 of Table 1. 1. Among these 2780 images, 
2224 images are used for training, and the remaining 556 images are used for validation. 
Among the 2224 images used for training, 468 images contained hazards. Furthermore, the 
author has collected 104 images from a second simulation where all the images contained 
hazards. These 104 images are used to evaluate or test the driving model performance. 
Table 1. 1 Dataset description 
Dataset type Collected 
dataset size 
Dataset size after 
data augmentation 
Dataset size  1390 2780 
Training dataset size  1112 2224 
Validation dataset size 278 556 





Model Training and Validation 
After the development of the end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model, the author 
trains it using the augmented dataset. This dataset is divided into two, 80% in a training set 
(2224 images as per Table 1. 1) and the remaining 20% in a validation set (556 images as 
per Table 1). The author then trains three models for our evaluation:  
Case 1:  A model trained on a dataset that includes hazards but without considering 
them as a separate input feature. 
Case 2: A model trained on a dataset that considers hazards as separate input features 
and uses a distance measurement sensor and image segmentation. In this case, the threat 
value is determined using a distance measurement sensor (Radar in our case), following 
Procedure 1 as described in the method section.   
Case 3: A model trained on a dataset that considers hazards as separate input features 
and uses image segmentation. In this case, the threat value is determined using the image 
segmentation, following Procedure 2 as described in the method section.   
 
For the training of the autonomous vehicle driving model, the author used the Adam 
optimizer that can change the learning rate dynamically (Konur 2015). The mean square 
error based loss function, a dropout rate of 0.5 in the last four FC layers, and L2 
regularization are used to reduce overfitting and under-fitting and to minimize training 
error (Baldi and Sadowski 2013). The author  useed model checkpoints to stop the training 
when the validation loss is not decreasing over time (“Keras,” n.d.). Figure 1. 11 shows the 
performance of the model training for Case 1, where the training is stopped after 14 epochs 
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because the model does not exhibit much improvement after 11 epochs. The author  
observes no overfitting or under-fitting during the training. In Case 2, the model stopped 
training after 16 epochs, and in Case 3, the model stopped the training after 15 epochs. 
 
Figure 1. 11 Training and validation performance of the end-to-end driving model for 
Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3 on the training and validation dataset (Islam et al. 2019). 
Analysis results 
After training and validating the model using the dataset from the first simulation, 
the author evaluates the trained end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model using the 
test dataset of 104 images (as depicted in Table 1. 1). The author created this dataset of 104 
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images from a second simulation where all debris are placed in the middle of the driving 
lane, and the author measured the predicted steering wheel angle for each test image. In 
this second simulation, first, the author creates the ground truth by manually driving the 
vehicle on the roadway. Then the author deploys the trained end-to-end autonomous 
vehicle driving model for Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3. The author then analyzes the 
performance of the model for each case using the following quantitative measures: root 
means square error (RMSE) and mean absolute error (MAE), and a qualitative measure 
through visualization. 
Quantitative Results of Model Performance 
The quantitative results include the RMSE and the MAE, which are measured by 
comparing the predicted steering wheel angle with the actual steering wheel angle (i.e., 








𝑀𝐴𝐸 =  
1
𝑁




where N is the total number of images in the testing dataset; and 𝐺𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖 are the 
ground truth and predicted steering wheel angle, respectively, for the 𝑖𝑡ℎ image of the 
testing dataset. As shown in Figure 1. 12, both the RMSE and MAE are higher for Case 1 
than Case 2 and Case 3. A lower RMSE and MAE indicate that the predicted steering wheel 
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angle is closely following the actual steering wheel angle or ground truth data related to 
steering wheel angle.  
 
Figure 1. 12 Error measurement on the testing dataset (Islam et al. 2019). 
 
The author measured the steering wheel angle prediction accuracy and 
improvement of Case 2 and Case 3, over Case 1. By comparing 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 of Case 2 and Case 
3 with 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒1, the author calculates the steering wheel angle prediction improvement 
based on the equation below:  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = (
| 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 − 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒1|
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒1
× 100)  %   
Based on our experiment, the author found a 21% improvement in the steering 
wheel angle prediction of Case 2 over Case 1, and 18% improvement in the steering wheel 
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angle prediction of Case 3 over Case 1. The results suggest that both Case 2 and Case 3 
improve autonomous vehicle navigation to avoid an unexpected hazard on the roadway.  
Qualitative Results for Driving Direction 
Figure 1. 13 shows the qualitative results of our study on the autonomous vehicle 
driving direction. To obtain the qualitative measurement, the author transforms the steering 
wheel angle (-0.5 to +0.5) into a driving direction angle (-25 degrees to +25 degrees) using 
a linear transformation. In Webots, the steering wheel angle follows the Ackermann 
geometry, representing a linear relationship between steering wheel angle and driving 
direction (Cyberbotics Ltd. 2013)(Mitchell, Staniforth, and Scott 2006). The prediction 
accuracy can be presented qualitatively by observing the driving direction angle or angle 
of movement of the autonomous vehicle. For example, Figure 1. 13 shows that the 
continuous steering wheel output of data from the time step of 64000 milliseconds (ms) to 
72000ms window for ground truth, Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3. In the presence of a hazard 
on the roadway, the autonomous vehicle driving model is producing the output for 
maneuvering the autonomous vehicle. According to Figure 1. 13, the autonomous vehicle 
is moving towards the left for each case. For example, in Case 1, at time step 66000ms, the 
predicted driving direction is +5.2 degrees, causing the car to move closer to the hazard 
(represented here as a box) compared to Case 2 and Case 3. However, in Case 2 and Case 
3, the predicted driving direction is +11.7 degree and +9.28 degree, respectively, which is 
a value closer to the ground truth than in Case 1. Overall, the qualitative results indicate 
better accuracy prediction for Case 2 and Case 3 than for Case 1. 
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Figure 1. 13 Qualitative results of ground truth, Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3 of the 
driving direction (Islam et al. 2019). 
 
Quantitative Results for Driving Direction 
Following the Frenet coordinate system, the author has performed quantitative 
analyses of hazard avoidance. In a Frenet coordinate system, the longitudinal movement 
and latitudinal movement are represented in the x-axis and y-axis, respectively (Houenou 
et al. 2013). Instead of following the Frenet coordinate system for the performance 
evaluation, the author plotted the time step in the x-axis and latitudinal movement in the y-
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axis (see Figure 1. 14) to show the deviation of latitudinal movement of an autonomous 
vehicle and how the vehicle avoids a hazardous object for different cases (as described in 
the ‘Model Training and Validation’ subsection) over the time. The author analyzed the 
trajectory of the autonomous vehicle and calculate the RMSE between the vehicle 
trajectory of each case and the ground truth. In Figure 1. 14, the author presents the 
autonomous vehicle trajectories for all three cases from the time step 62000ms to 72000ms 
to show how accurately the vehicle following the ground truth trajectory data for each case 
to avoid the hazardous object. For Case 2, the vehicle trajectory produced from the 
autonomous vehicle driving systems is closely following the ground truth vehicle trajectory 
compared to Case 1 and Case 3. However, in all cases, i.e., Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3, the 
vehicle can avoid the hazard (Figure 1. 14). In Case 1, the RMSE value was 0.52. On the 
other hand, the RMSE values for Case 2 and Case 3 are 0.07 and 0.23, respectively. The 
author performed a statistical significance test (pairwise t-test) between the ground truth 
and each case separately at a 95% confidence interval. The author finds that Case 1 is 
significantly different from the ground truth at a 95% confidence interval. However, Case 
2, which uses both image segmentation and a distance measurement sensor, and Case 3, 
which only uses the segmented image, are not significantly different from the ground truth. 
Thus, based on the statistical analyses of Case 2 and Case 3, the author achieves the same 
level of performance using image segmentation, and not using any additional distance 
measurement sensor, i.e., Radar. 
 28 
 
Figure 1. 14 Trajectory of the autonomous vehicle for ground truth, Case 1, Case 2, 
and Case 3 (Islam et al. 2019). 
Chapter Conclusions  
Detecting unexpected hazards on a roadway is a crucial task for the safe operation 
of an autonomous vehicle. In this work, the author developed and evaluated a DNN-based 
driving system for autonomous vehicles in an unexpected hazardous roadway environment. 
First, the author detects the hazard, and then using semantic segmentation, the author 
extracts the hazard information and perform data fusion to improve the navigation of an 
autonomous vehicle. This study makes the following contributions to the current body of 
research: (i) the author evaluates the effect of the hazardous roadway environment on the 
DNN-based driving system of an autonomous vehicle; (ii) the author  develops a DNN-
based driving system for autonomous driving that can address an unexpected hazardous 
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roadway environment and can navigate the autonomous vehicle safely through this 
environment. More specifically, the author explored the object detection and semantic 
segmentation based deep learning models to address an unsafe navigational problem; (iii) 
the author  contributes a new dataset that can be used by the autonomous vehicle 
community to improve the driving model in unexpected hazardous roadway environment. 
Based on the analysis result, the author concludes that our method improved the safety of 
the autonomous vehicle by 21% in terms of avoiding hazards, compared to a vision-based 
navigation system of autonomous vehicles having no hazard detection and segmentation 
as separate input features. Future work will include fusing the temporal and spatial 
information into the DNN-based model, potentially further improving the safety of 







DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF A CONNECTED 
VEHICLE APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT PLATFORM (CVDEP) 
 
Introduction 
Connected vehicle (CV) application developers need a development platform to 
build, test, and debug real-world CV applications, such as safety, mobility, and 
environmental applications, in edge-centric cyber-physical systems. Our objective is to 
develop and evaluate a scalable and secure CV application development platform (CVDeP) 
that enables application developers to build, test, and debug CV applications in real-time 
while meeting the functional requirements of any CV applications. The author evaluated 
the efficacy of the CVDeP using two types of CV applications (one safety and one mobility 
application) and validated them through field experiments at the South Carolina Connected 
Vehicle Testbed (SC-CVT). Our analyses show that the CVDeP satisfies the functional 
requirements in terms of latency and throughput of a CV application while maintaining the 
scalability and security of the platform and applications (Islam et al. 2020). 
The emerging connected vehicle (CV) environment consists of different 
components, such as vehicle onboard units (OBUs), and roadside units (RSUs), which are 
capable of exchanging data with each other as well as communicating with personal 
devices (e.g., cell phone), sensors (e.g., camera sensors), and traffic management centers 
(TMCs) (Sotelo et al. 2012). With integrated computing and control capabilities, these 
connected physical components communicate with each other to form a cyber-physical 
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system (CPS). The architecture reference for cooperative and intelligent transportation 
(ARC-IT), which has been developed with the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (USDOT), has listed the functional requirements and provided the 
implementation guidelines of over a hundred CV applications for safety, mobility, and 
environmental benefits (ARC-IT 2019). For example, “vehicle data for traffic operations 
(2)” is a CV application, which uses CV data obtained from vehicle OBUs to support 
roadway traffic operations. To develop such CV applications for an edge-centric CPS, 
developers need a dedicated platform where they can build, test, and debug CV 
applications. The operational data environment (ODE) system, which is being developed 
by Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office (ITS JPO n.d.), is a real-time 
data collection and distribution software system that collects, processes, and distributes 
data to different components of the CV environment, such as CVs themselves, personal 
mobile devices, infrastructure components (e.g., traffic signal) and sensors (e.g., camera 
and environmental sensor). Although a user can stream CV data through the ODE platform 
in real-time for developing a CV application, it does not provide a platform for the 
application developers to build, test, and debug CV applications. Thus, it is critical to 
develop an application development platform and evaluate the platform in terms of latency 
and throughput to satisfy the temporal and spatial requirements of CV applications (Du et 
al. 2018). 
Considering a large-scale deployment of connected vehicle CPS, the concept of 
edge computing is introduced as the underlying computing approach (Rayamajhi et al. 
2017). Edge computing has the potential benefits for enabling reduced communication 
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latency and increased scalability. Such benefits are a result of bringing resources, such as 
storage, and computational resources, closer to the edge (Lopez et al. 2015)(Grethe authors  
et al. 2017). In an edge-centric CPS, the resources for communication, computation, 
control, and storage are placed at different edge layers (e.g., a mobile edge as a vehicle, a 
fixed edge as a roadside infrastructure, and a system edge as a backend server or  TMC) in 
a CV environment (Rayamajhi et al. 2017). Therefore, a CV application can be divided 
into sub-applications where sub-applications of a CV application run in different edge 
layers depending on the requirements of an application. 
Major challenges for developing a CV application development platform for an 
edge-centric CPS are to (a) collect, process, and distribute data while running multiple CV 
applications concurrently in real-time in different edge layers; and (b) provide the 
scalability and security of the platform and applications. The objective of this study is to 
develop and evaluate a scalable and secure CV application development platform that 
handles real-time data from CVs in an edge-centric CPS and can satisfy the requirements 
imposed by CV applications. This platform, which the author calls ‘connected vehicle 
application development platform (CVDeP)’ has been designed to hide the underlying low-
level software, hardware, and associated details. An application development graphical 
user interface provides the application developers easy and secure access to the edge 
devices. The access control and credential management module in the application 
development platform prevents unwanted access to the edge devices, which provides 
platform security. In addition, the application security module prevents malicious 
operations or activities propagated through an application in an edge-centric CPS. In this 
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study, a policy-based security system is utilized to provide application security against 
cyberattacks. However, developing security policies for detecting different types of 
cyberattacks and identifying related countermeasures are not the focus of this study. 
The author  conducted experiments to evaluate the efficacy of the CVDeP using a 
safety application (i.e., “forward collision warning (FCW)” (ARC-IT 2019)) and a mobility 
application (i.e., vehicle data for traffic operations (ARC-IT 2019)). These applications 
were developed and evaluated in an emulated environment and later validated in a real-
world edge-centric South Carolina Connected Vehicle Testbed (SC-CVT), which is located 
at Clemson, South Carolina. The FCW application was selected for our experiment, as it is 
a fundamental application for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) safety (8). Similarly, the vehicle 
data for traffic operations application was selected, because this application supports many 
other vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) safety and mobility applications, such as cooperative 
adaptive cruise control, incident detection, and implementation of localized roadway traffic 
operational strategies (e.g., altering signal timing based on traffic flows, freeway speed 
harmonization, and optimization of ramp metering rates) (ARC-IT 2019). In addition, the 
efficacy of the CVDeP was presented using two communication-related measures of 
effectiveness, which are latency and throughput. 
Contribution of the study 
The primary contribution of this study is the development of an architecture for an 
edge-centric CV application development platform (Islam et al. 2020).  In this study, the 
author  systemically developed the architecture of the CVDeP and evaluated and validated 
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the CVDeP through experiments. In the “Conceptual Development and Implementation of 
CVDeP” subsection of the “Connected Vehicle Application Development Platform 
(CVDeP)” section, the author  presented the architecture of the application development 
platform and defined each module of this architecture. The architecture of the development 
platform supports modular development so that any user can easily include additional 
modules (e.g., adding an energy optimization module at mobile and fixed edge levels for 
an eco-driving application) into the development platform if and when needed. 
Furthermore, the author  published the source code of the CVDeP on GitHub, an open-
source platform, so that any external users can use it and contribute to expanding its utility 
of CVDeP by adding more modules (Islam 2019). The CVDeP open-source software will 
be maintained through a git version-control system. 
Related work 
To develop the CVDeP that uses real-time CV data, the author reviewed existing 
work related to the CV applications development requirements, and developer access 
control and application security.  
CV Application Development Requirements 
CV applications are bounded by temporal and spatial requirements for providing 
the desired services (Karagiannis et al. 2011). If CV data are not received within the 
temporal and spatial threshold as required by a CV application, CV data will not have any 
efficacy for real-time applications. The Michigan connected vehicle testbed ‘Proof of 
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concept test report’ categorized CV data by time and spatial contexts (U.S. Department of 
Transportation (US DOT) 2010), meaning that timestamp information and location 
information should be included in the CV data.   
Application developers may require two kinds of data depending on the application, 
namely real-time disaggregated data and aggregated data. For example, applications such 
as incident detection applications require real-time disaggregated data for running and 
testing of algorithms (Du et al. 2018), thus making it necessary for the platform to provide 
such data. On the other hand, applications, such as those that provide queue warning after 
every 5 minutes (Balke, Charara, and Sunkari 2014) may not require the disaggregated 
data, but aggregated data is sufficient. A CV environment is considered to be one of the 
largest distributed networks of the near future (Qian and Moayeri 2008). As the size of the 
network grows (e.g., number of vehicles, sensors, and roadside infrastructures), the demand 
for data will also increase (Baker et al. 2016). Thus, a platform for the CV application 
developers needs to be designed in such a way so that it can handle a high demand of data 
without compromising the quality of service (in terms of temporal and spatial 
requirements). Thus, in providing the data to the users, the CVDeP needs to meet the 
application requirement in terms of latency and throughput and must be capable of handling 
the scalability issue related to the increasing number of connected vehicles, sensors, and 
roadside infrastructures.  
Access Control and Application Security 
Security is one of the major concerns in deploying CV applications because of the 
safety-critical aspect of connected transportation systems (Zarki et al. 2002)(Raw, Kumar, 
 36 
and Singh 2013). The USDOT partnered with the automotive industry and industry security 
experts to design and develop a state-of-the-art security framework and presented a security 
concept called ‘security credential management system (SCMS)’ to provide privacy and 
integrity to a CV system as well as provide CV application security. The data shared 
between applications and edge devices need to be secured and the author needs to maintain 
data confidentiality, integrity, and availability (ARC-IT 2019). One way to protect the data 
from unwanted user access is to authenticate user information before sharing and streaming 
data. In SCMS, fixed edges (e.g., a communication device (e.g., RSU) along with a 
computing device (e.g., general-purpose processor)) will provide a certificate to a CV 
application, which can be used by the application for exchanging messages (Whyte et al. 
2013)(Ahmed-Zaid, F., Bai, F., Bai, S., Basnayake, C., Bellur, B., Brovold, S., Brown, G., 
Caminiti, L., Cunningham, D., Elzein, H., Hong, K., Ivan, J., Jiang, D., Kenney, J., 
Krishnan, H., Lovell, J., Maile, M., Masselink, D., McGlohon, E., Mudalige, P., Popov et 
al. 2011). A registration authority (RA) and a certificate authority (CA) were considered 
for providing the certificates. While an RA verifies the user request and checks the digital 
signature, a CA issues a new digital certificate or renews a certificate. In our study, the 
author adopted a security module for access control and credential management following 
the SCMS. The application security management is adopted based on security policies 
developed by (Islam et al. 2018). In this study, the author considered the access control and 
credential management and application security, however, network security is not part of 
this study. 
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Connected vehicle application development platform (CVDeP) 
Figure 2. 1 presented the conceptual development and implementation, and the 
evaluation and validation of the CVDeP. In an edge-centric CPS, the CVDeP architecture 
is developed including an application management platform and an application 
development graphical user interface for CV application development. The application 
management platform contains three modules: (i) control platform module; (ii) 
communication module; and (iii) data warehouse module. The application development 
graphical interface contains a graphical user interface through which an application 
developer can develop and deploy any CV application in the edge devices. The control 
platform module includes four sub-modules in total: (i) access control and credential 
management; (ii) application security management; (iii) data collection and distribution; 
and (iv) data broadcasting and receiving.  The author evaluated and validated the CVDeP 
using selected safety and mobility applications in two stages: (i) evaluation in an emulated 
environment; and (ii) field validation in a real-world edge-centric SC-CVT. The safety 
application is evaluated using communication and computational latency metrics. On the 
other hand, the mobile application is evaluated using communication and computational 
latency along with data transmission throughput (to test the scalability of the platform). 
Later, the author explained the experimental set-up in the emulated and real-world 
environment and CV applications for the evaluation of the CVDeP. In the following 




Figure 2. 1 Approach for the CVDeP development, evaluation and validation (Islam 
et al. 2020). 
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Conceptual Development and Implementation of CVDeP  
In an edge-centric CPS, the physical proximity of devices to the data source reduces 
the wireless communication latency, and a layered architecture increases the scalability 
(Mashrur Chowdhury et al. 2018). The edge-centric CPS as shown in Figure 2. 2 for a CV 
system consists of three edge layers: (i) mobile edge (e.g., on-board sensors and computing 
device inside a vehicle); (ii) fixed edge (e.g., roadside transportation data infrastructure); 
and (iii) system edge (e.g., backend server at TMC) (Rayamajhi et al. 2017). This 
hierarchical cyber-physical system architecture can address complexity and scale issues of 
CV systems. Participating CVs in our system will act as mobile edges and are equipped 
with a low latency communication device. Although the author considered DSRC in our 
study, any low latency communication technology, such as 5G and LTE for Vehicles (LTE-
V) can be incorporated in our development platform. A fixed edge includes a general-
purpose processor (i.e., application development device) and a dedicated short-range 
communication (DSRC)-based RSU. A fixed edge can communicate with mobile edges 
using DSRC and communicate with the system edge using optical fiber or Wi-Fi. A fixed 
edge can be extended to support a video camera and other sensing devices, such as weather 
sensors and GPS. A system edge can be a single endpoint in a cloud server. Fixed edges 
are connected to a system edge through a long-range communication option, such as optical 
fiber or LTE/Wi-Fi. Mobile edges (edge layer 1) can exchange data with fixed edges (edge 
layer 2) and system edges (edge layer 3) using DSRC and LTE/Wi-Fi communication, 
respectively, as shown in Figure 2. 2. 
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Figure 2. 2 The CVDeP architecture for an edge-centric CPS (Islam et al. 2020) 
 In an edge-centric CPS for CVs, each component generates different types of data. 
For example, an OBU installed in a vehicle (i.e., mobile edge) broadcasts basic safety 
messages (BSMs), which contain a vehicle’s information, such as location, speed, 
direction, acceleration, and braking status (Kenney 2011). A fixed edge collects data from 
the OBUs within its communication range, and acts as a primary gateway to transfer data 
from CVs to the transportation infrastructures (e.g., system edge, which could represent a 
TMC). For developing a CV application, developers need to interact with all of the edge 
layers. Edge layers can be accessed through an application development graphical user 
interface, which provides a way for a CV application developer to interact with the different 
edges. Figure 2. 2 illustrates the architecture of the CVDeP for an edge-centric CPS, which 
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comprises of application management platform and application development graphical 
user interface. 
Application Management Platform 
The application management platform is responsible for the selection of an 
appropriate communication medium for an application, and data collection, storage, 
broadcasting, and distribution, while providing the security of the platform by enabling 
secured access to the edge layers and security of the CV applications. As presented in 
Figure 2. 2, application developers interact with the application management platform 
through an application development graphical user interface. The application management 
platform is a part of each edge layer of the edge-centric CPS. The application management 
platform is made up of the following modules: (i) control platform module; (ii) data 
warehouse module; and (iii) communication module. The following subsections describe 
the conceptual development and implementation of each of the modules in detail. 
Conceptual development of control platform module 
 
The control platform module of the system edge (edge layer 3) supports three types 
of sub-modules: (i) access control and credential management; (ii) application security 
management; and (iii) data collection and distribution. On the other hand, the control 
platform module of the fixed edge (edge layer 2) supports four types of sub-modules: (i) 
access control and credential management; (ii) application security management; (iii) data 
collection and distribution; and (iv) data broadcasting and receiving. However, the control 
platform module of mobile edge (edge layer 1) includes: (i) access control and credential 
management; (ii) application security management; and (iii) data broadcasting and 
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receiving.  
In an edge-centric CPS, edge devices continuously exchange data between different 
edges. The data broadcasting and receiving module in the mobile edges and fixed edges 
handles the continuous data exchange between other mobile edges and fixed edges. This 
module continuously broadcasts and receives messages that can be used to develop CV 
applications through application development graphical user interface. On the other hand, 
the data collection and distribution module in fixed edges and system edges are responsible 
to gather and distribute data to and from mobile edges, fixed edges, and system edge in 
real-time. After the access control and credential management modules are activated, an 
authenticated application developer can access, gather and visualize real-time streaming 
data generated from different edges of an edge-centric CPS. In addition, the application 
security management module is responsible for monitoring the data flow and securing the 
application using security policies.  
Implementation of control platform module 
The control platform module contains the following sub-modules, and what sub-modules 
are included in each layer varies by whether the edge device is a mobile, fixed or system 
edge. Implementation overviews of these sub-modules are as follows: 
 Access control and credential management. The access control and credential 
management sub-module ensures that only authorized users have access to CVDeP 
services. A CV application developer is authenticated via a login interface before giving 
access to the edge-centric CPS testbed components. Permission-based access control is 
implemented by providing access rights to application-specific data and services (e.g., 
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access to the BSMs, access to sensors data, access to the data warehouse) like an android 
application system where permission are written in a manifest file prior to developers 
develop an Android application (Felt et al. 2012). On the other hand, the credential 
management system (CMS) is implemented based on the public key infrastructure (PKI), 
which takes care of public key exchange that is needed for encrypting and authenticating 
data using a digital signature. A digital signature is used to verify the authenticity of a 
message. The CMS is built in such a way that the functionalities of SCMS presented by 
the USDOT are replicated (Whyte et al. 2013)(Brecht et al. 2018). The  author followed 
the assumptions of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
supported connected vehicle pilot program where V2V messages are digitally signed 
with a digital signature, but not encrypted, and V2I messages are both signed and 
encrypted (Weil 2017).  
 Application security management. In order to provide security for any applications, a 
data consumer and a data producer must be authenticated and complete certificate 
exchange (data flow1 (DF1) and (data flow 2 (DF2)) to send any producer generated data 
and receive any verified producer generated data, respectively (as shown in Figure 2. 3). 
The access control and credential management module is used to authenticate and 
exchange certificates to secure access (as described in the “access control and credential 
management” module) to any edge devices. As presented in (Fernandes et al. 2016), the 
author implemented a flow policy-based application security in the application security 
management module, which contains trusted API and quarantine submodules. In our 
study, the author implemented the flow policies using ‘<source, sink>’ tracking 
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(Fernandes et al. 2016) in which the source is the producer of the data and sink is the 
intended consumer of that data. The trusted API submodule removes any sensitive 
information (e.g., drivers identify and vehicle ID of a mobile edge) from the producer 
generated data (data flow 3 (DF3)). The quarantine submodule will remove any 
unexpected or malicious data flows between a producer and a consumer that is not listed 
in the flow policies. Flow policies can be pre-defined or can be changed by an 
administrator (e.g., a certificate authority) dynamically. Finally, verified data from a 
producer is passed to its intended consumer (data flow 4 (DF4)).  
 
Figure 2. 3 Implementation of application security management module, and access 
control and credential management module  (Islam et al. 2020). 
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 Data collection and distribution. The data collection and distribution sub-module is the 
core part of the fixed and system edges of the CVDeP. The author  selected Kafka (Kreps, 
Narkhede, and Rao 2011) as a broker-based data collection and distribution system 
because of the following efficacies: (i) high throughput; (ii) low latency; (ii) reliability 
of data delivery and (iv) scalability. In a publish-subscribe based broker-system, such as 
Kafka, Message queuing telemetry transport (MQTT) and WebSphere, data producers 
(e.g., mobile edges, fixed edges, connected vehicle applications) produce and publish 
data to the broker, whereas the data consumers (e.g., fixed edge, connected vehicle 
applications) subscribe and consume the data available at the broker. By tagging 
individual data elements with a label based on a topic, producers (e.g., a connected 
vehicle) can produce data on a particular topic, and consumers (e.g., a CV application) 
can subscribe and consume the data of that topic. The broker receives data from 
producers and immediately makes the data available for consumers to consume. As a 
result, producers and consumers can generate and consume data, respectively, 
asynchronously and independently reducing the latency and improving reliability. 
 Data broadcasting and receiving. The data broadcasting and receiving sub-module is 
developed for mobile edges and fixed edges, where it is responsible for broadcasting 
BSMs and receiving BSMs from other mobile edges and fixed edges. In our 
implementation, each mobile edge broadcasts BSMs at a default rate of 10Hz and each 
BSM contains necessary attributes for safety applications (e.g., position, speed, and 
direction) (Kenney 2011)(Park and Kim 2012). Additionally, each fixed edge broadcasts 
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safety warnings (e.g., intersection safety warning) at a rate of 10Hz, which are generated 
for V2I applications.   In addition, each mobile edge and each fixed edge receives BSMs 
from all other mobile edges and fixed edges within their corresponding communication 
range. 
Conceptual development of data warehouse module 
The data warehouse module stores the data generated from different edge devices, 
roadside sensors, and applications deployed in the fixed and system edge layers. It is a 
distributed storage system that resides in fixed edges and system edges. The purpose of the 
data warehouse module is to store and provide the necessary historical data that is needed 
by the CV application developers and/or edge layers. As a mobile edge is limited by 
computation power and storage size, the author did not include a data warehouse module 
in mobile edges. In fixed edges and system edges, the structure of the data warehouse 
module is such that it can support and store both structured (e.g., GPS data) and 
unstructured data (e.g., text and images). A structured data has a strict tabular format whose 
column size and attributes of each entity are defined. Examples of structured data include 
any data that can be stored in delimited formats, spreadsheets, or SQL tables, whose 
columns are defined. A semi-structured data includes data whose fields are defined but 
organized hierarchically. Examples include data stored in extensible markup language 
(XML) or JavaScript object notation (JSON) formats. Unstructured data, such as pictures, 
videos, and textual data, do not have any structural organization associated with the data 
itself. 
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Implementation of data warehouse module 
In our implementation, to support structured, semi-structured, as well as 
unstructured data, the author used MySQL for structured data in a tabular format, and 
MongoDB for semi-structured and unstructured data in JSON format. The structured, semi-
structured, and unstructured data together produces a huge amount of data in terms of 
volume. Realistically, CV applications do not need to access the raw data in their original 
format. Thus, a big data engineering infrastructure can be employed to reduce and 
compress raw data for further direct access by CV applications. In our case, the author used 
Clemson University’s Cypress cluster for this purpose. Cypress is a Hadoop-based big data 
cluster and has both Hadoop Distributed File System (“Hadoop,” n.d.) for large-scale data 
storage and Apache Spark for big data processing (Zaharia et al. 2010).  
Conceptual development of communication module 
The communication module decides the best available communication medium 
based on the communication latency requirement of an application. Developers will 
provide the requirements of an application to the communication module through the 
application development graphical user interface, and then the communication module 
creates an abstraction layer to characterize communication network attributes of the 
available communication networks. For example, the communication module could select 
DSRC, 5G or LTE-V, or any low latency communication medium, from the available 
communication mediums to satisfy the requirement of safety applications. While the 
application is running in an edge device, the CVDeP will provide communication metadata 
(e.g., available communication mediums, such as DSRC, 5G, LTE, LTE-V, and Wi-Fi, and 
their average, maximum, and minimum transmission latency and throughput) for 
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evaluating the performance of the application. The decision for selecting a wireless 
communication medium, by the communication module, will be completed based on the 
characteristics of available communication mediums and the application requirements set 
by the application developers.    
Implementation of communication module 
The communication module manages the underlying communication network 
connectivity in an edge-centric CPS. The communication network services are 
implemented in the network layer of each edge device to manage the connectivity using 
the available communication mediums to connect with other edge devices. In our 
communication module implementation, the discovery or searching of communication 
mediums and their network characteristics are measured asynchronously. The 
communication module selects a medium to use for transmitting and receiving data based 
on the application requirements. The author added a metadata support layer in the 
communication module to provide metadata to the application developers that can support 
them to develop their applications. Through this metadata layer, developers will be able to 
observe the communication attributes, such as signal strength, bandwidth utilization, and 
data loss. A script running in the CVDeP provides communication attributes to the 
developers through the application development graphical user interface, and developers 
can evaluate the performance of an application through these attributes. 
Application Development Graphical User Interface 
Application developers can access the underlying edge devices of the edge-centric 
CPS using a graphical user interface and can develop and deploy any CV application 
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directly on the edge-centric CPS. Based on access control rights to the available services 
(e.g., communication services and data storage service) of the platform and the 
requirements of a CV application, an application developer can access different types of 
data (e.g., real-time and historical data) from each layer through an application 
development graphical user interface. Using this application development graphical user 
interface, application developers can also request any specific data for a specific 
application purpose. For example, developers can request historical data from the data 
warehouse module to predict future roadway traffic conditions. Application development 
graphical user interface will provide an interactive platform to the developers to build their 
applications and test these applications by requesting real-time data from both mobile and 
fixed edges, and historical data from the data warehouse module from both fixed and 




Figure 2. 4 Implementation of application development graphical user interface 
(Islam et al. 2020). 
 
As shown in Figure 2. 4, the application development graphical user interface is 
divided into four blocks: (i) applications development services block (using this block a 
developer can connect to the edge devices through an authentication procedure using the 
accessibility details, such as username and password. After the authentication procedure, 
developers will be provided with a list of available edge devices (e.g., location, number, 
and type of edge devices), services (e.g., available communication mediums and their 
characteristics), and sensors (e.g., GPS, camera) of each edge device.); (ii) applications 
development block (inside this block, an application developer can implement an 
application in an edge device using Python or C++); (iii) Applications development tools 
(using this block, an application developer can develop, deploy, test, and debug an 
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application in edge devices); and (iv) Applications output and performance measurement 
block (after deploying an application, developers can observe and save the output and 
performance data of an application through this block).  The application development 
graphical user interface is developed as a desktop application in C# (C sharp) as illustrated 
in Figure 2. 4. Currently, the software has been developed for the Windows operating 
systems as a proof-of-concept.  
Experimental setup  
This section describes the experimental set-up in an emulated environment as well 
as a real-world environment to evaluate the efficacy of the CVDeP.  
Experimental Setup in Emulated Environment   
A developer can develop and evaluate the performance of the developed CV 
applications in the emulated environment. In this environment, the developer will have 
dedicated hardware to emulate the real-world edge-centric CPS. As shown in Figure 2. 5, 
a developer can emulate mobile edges using hardware setup #1 and #2 and fixed edges 
using hardware setup #3, where system edges are set-up in a dedicated server at Clemson 
University. Each hardware setup (#1, #2, and #3) consists of one DSRC unit to send and 
receive the DSRC messages, and a computing device for computation. Hardware setup #1 
is used for developing the safety application whereas hardware setup #2 is used for 
emulating other mobile edges for the safety application. For mobility and environmental 
applications, only hardware setup #2 can be used for emulating mobile edges. Hardware 
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setup #3 is used for creating any number of fixed edges where the location of fixed edges 
is defined by a developer through the application development graphical user interface. A 
dedicated server located at Clemson University is used for creating system edge instances.  
In this emulated edge-centric CPS, mobile edges and fixed edges communicate with each 
other using DSRC, and fixed edges and system edges communicate using the Clemson 
University communication network, which includes an optical fiber and Wi-Fi 
connections. In addition, developers can configure the number of edges in each layer as 
required by an application. To generate the movement data of mobile edges, the movement 
of the mobile edges is exported from the ‘Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) (“DLR - 
Institute of Transportation Systems - SUMO – Simulation of Urban MObility” 2017)’, 
which is a microscopic traffic simulator software, as a SUMO trace file. Using this SUMO 
trace file, developers can create any roadway environment, and generate any number of 
emulated vehicles and their corresponding BSMs. A program running in mobile edges 
reads that trace file and generates BSMs for each vehicle. Then, these BSMs are 
broadcasted using DSRC to each vehicle. Fixed edges will receive BSMs from mobile 
edges within their corresponding communication ranges. Developers can access the edges 
through the CVDeP application development graphical user interface to develop and 
evaluate the performance of the developed CV application. 
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Figure 2. 5 CVDeP setup in an emulated edge-centric CPS (Islam et al. 2020). 
 
The author implemented all the modules of the CVDeP in each layer, as shown in 
Figure 2. 6. Hardware setup #1 and #2 represent the edge layer 1, Hardware setup #3 
represents the edge layer 2, and the Server setup represents the edge layer 3 of an edge-
centric CPS. The implemented modules of the CVDeP are (i) control platform module, 
which consists of access control and credential management, application security 
management, data collection and distribution, and data broadcasting and receiving; (ii) 
communication module; and (iii) data warehouse module. The control platform module 
resides in a computing device and is implemented in each hardware setup. However, the 
data broadcasting and receiving sub-module of the control platform module resides in a 
computing device, which is a part of each mobile and fixed edges. For the data warehouse 
module, the author used an external hard disk drive (HDD) for storing data in the fixed 
edges, and cloud storage for storing data in the system edge. In our case, an application 
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developer interacts with each hardware through the Clemson University communication 
network to develop, debug, and test a CV application.  
 
Figure 2. 6 Implementation of CVDeP modules in an emulated edge-centric CPS (Islam 
et al. 2020). 
 
Experimental Setup in SC-CVT 
The SC-CVT has three fixed edges, which are deployed along the Perimeter Road 
in Clemson, South Carolina, and one system edge is deployed as the backend server 
(Mashrur Chowdhury et al. 2018). The backend server is located at Clemson University 
and connected to the Clemson University network.  Two of the fixed edges are connected 
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to the Clemson University network with an optical fiber link and one fixed edge is 
connected to the Clemson University network with a Wi-Fi link. Each fixed edge has its 
DSRC radio to communicate with mobile edges. Each mobile edge (primarily OBUs on 
vehicles) is equipped with wireless communication devices. In our case, the author used 
DSRC-enabled OBUs, although, any low latency communication mediums, such as 5G or 
LTE-V can be used. As per our definition of a mobile edge, a connected vehicle will act as 
a mobile edge and a vehicle owner will own a commercially available low latency 
communication device (e.g., DSRC, 5G, or LTE-V enabled communication device) along 
with a computing device for running an application at the vehicle level. Also, a vehicle 
owner can install these communication and computing devices to create a mobile edge.  
Evaluation and validation of CVDeP 
For our experiments, the author  developed a forward collision warning (FCW) as 
a safety application and vehicle data for traffic operations as a mobility application (ARC-
IT 2019) using the CVDeP. Then, to prove the efficacy of the CVDeP, the FCW and vehicle 
data for traffic operations applications are evaluated in an emulated environment and the 
real-world SC-CVT (Mashrur Chowdhury et al. 2018). 
Safety Application  
For our experiment related to safety application, the author selected forward 
collision warning (FCW) that considers two vehicles moving in the same direction on the 
same lane in an uncongested urban traffic condition. The FCW application is based on the 
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study by Xiang et.al.(Xiang, Qin, and Xiang 2014), where the FCW application uses the 
vehicle kinematics (VK) model for generating collision warnings using DSRC 
communication. Based on the VK model, the FCW application generates rear-end collision 
warnings when two vehicles are closer than a defined safe distance. In our study, the 
following equation is used for implementing an FCW application as suggested by Xiang 
et.al.(Xiang, Qin, and Xiang 2014). 
𝐷𝑤=  
 (𝑉𝑜 −  𝑉𝑡)
2
2 ∗  𝑎
+ 𝑑 
where 𝐷𝑤 is the distance threshold for collision warning;  𝑉𝑜 is the preceding 
vehicle’s speed; and 𝑉𝑡  is the follower vehicle’s speed. The follower vehicle is the vehicle 
where the FCW application is intended to run; d is calculated by adding half of the length 
of the preceding vehicle with the half of the length of the following vehicle, and 𝑎 is set to 
11.2 ft/s2 (American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO) 2011). Given the emulated environment within the CVDeP platform, as shown 
in Figure 2. 5, it is possible to generate complex urban scenarios and develop and evaluate 
appropriate FCW application corresponding to such scenarios. Using a complex urban 
scenario, an application developer can develop an FCW application considering different 
safety constraints within that environment. 
Evaluation Scenarios 
The author created two evaluation scenarios for evaluating the CVDeP as a safety 
application development platform.  
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 Scenario 1: The preceding vehicle (hardware setup #2 in Figure 2. 5), and the follower 
vehicle (hardware setup #1 in Figure 2. 5) is moving in the same direction on the same 
lane at 20 mph and 30 mph, respectively.  
 Scenario 2: The preceding vehicle and follower vehicle both are moving at 30 mph 
and the preceding vehicle stops suddenly.  
In both scenarios, the FCW application is deployed in the follower vehicle, and forward-
collision warnings are generated based on the comparison between calculated safety 
distance and the distance between two vehicles using real-time GPS data. To evaluate the 
performance of the application, the author considered data delivery latency as a measure 
of effectiveness. In this context, latency is the duration between the time when a BSM is 
generated by a mobile edge and the time when the application produces an FCW message 
in the follower vehicle. Here, latency includes network latency, computational latency, and 
communication medium selection latency.  
Evaluation in Emulated Environment  
The author evaluated the FCW application, using the experimental setup as 
described in the previous section. The application is developed using the CVDeP, and then 
the application is tested using two evaluation scenarios. Table 2. 1 provides a summary of 
latency recorded from both evaluation scenarios. For the evaluation of the FCW application 
in the emulated environment, the author analyzed the BSMs of 200 seconds observation 
period containing 4000 BSMs from two mobile edges to calculate the maximum, 
minimum, and average latency. A connected vehicle broadcasts BSMs and receives BSMs 
from other connected vehicles within its communication range.  A CV safety application’s 
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critical latency requirement represents the maximum acceptable time from generating 
BSMs by a preceding vehicle to generating an FCW message by a follower vehicle within 
the preceding vehicle’s communication range. If an FCW message is received by the driver 
of the follower vehicle within this safety-critical latency requirement, the driver can take 
action to avoid a collision after receiving a forward collision warning (Qing Xu et al. 2003). 
In our case, the author  selected 200 ms as a maximum safety-critical latency requirement 
(Mashrur Chowdhury et al. 2018) in which a driver can decelerate at a deceleration rate of 
11.2 ft/s2 (American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO) 2011), and avoid the forward collision if the warning message was delivered 
within 200 ms.  Therefore, the maximum end-to-end latency requirement is considered as 
200 ms, which will ensure the driver to stop the vehicle in case of a forward collision 
scenario.  In our emulated experimental environment, the author found that the average 
latency is 18 ms for both evaluation scenario 1 and scenario 2. However, the recorded 
maximum latencies were 97 milliseconds (ms) and 79 ms, for scenarios 1 and 2, 
respectively, which are below the safety-critical latency requirement for connected vehicles 
(i.e., 200ms (Dey et al. 2016)). For the evaluation of the FCW application in the emulated 
environment, the author analyzed the data of 200s containing 4000 BSMs from two mobile 
edges to calculate the maximum, minimum, and average latency. In Table 2. 1, the author 
presented the end-to-end latency, which includes communication network latency, 
computational latency, and communication medium selection latency. The computational 
latency for running the application is 1.5 ms, which is the same for both evaluation 
scenarios. In addition, these FCW messages are sent to the mobile edge using the best 
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available communication medium as decided by the communication module, which takes 
about 0.5 ms on average to make such a determination. During this communication medium 
selection process, all communication mediums (LTE, Wi-Fi, and DSRC) were running 
simultaneously, and the communication module was monitoring these mediums 
asynchronously and selects the best communication medium for a connected vehicle 
application following the heterogeneous wireless networking concept for CVs (Dey et al. 
2016).   















for Safety Application 





Maximum  97 ms  79 ms 
≤ 200 ms 
Average  18 ms  18 ms  
Minimum  4 ms  4 ms  
SC-CVT 
Maximum 115 ms  107 ms  
Average 65 ms  51 ms  
Minimum 4 ms  5 ms  
Note: *Scenario #1: The preceding vehicle and follower vehicle are moving in the same 
direction on the same lane at 20 mph and 30 mph, respectively; and ** Scenario #2: 
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The preceding vehicle and follower vehicle both are moving at 30 mph and the 
preceding vehicle stops suddenly. 
Field Validation in SC-CVT  
For our field evaluation of the FCW application in SC-CVT, the author followed 
similar speed for the corresponding vehicles for both evaluation scenarios and measured 
the end-to-end latency for the FCW application. Table 2. 1 provides a summary of end-to-
end latency recorded for both evaluation scenarios in the field experiments and an emulated 
environment.  Similar to the evaluation in an emulated environment, the author analyzed 
the data sample of 200s containing 4000 BSMs from two mobile edges to calculate the 
maximum, minimum, and average latency. The average end-to-end latency measured is 65 
ms and 51 ms for scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. The maximum end-to-end latency 
recorded for the test is 115 ms and 107 ms for scenarios 1 and 2, respectively, which is 
below the safety-critical latency requirement (i.e., 200 ms (Dey et al. 2016)). In our field 
experiment, the author observed a higher latency than the latency measured in the emulated 
experimental setup because of the surrounding environmental effect or wireless 
communication propagation loss. In Table 2. 1, the author presented the end-to-end latency 
which includes the network latency, computational latency, and communication medium 
selection latency. In both cases (scenarios 1 and 2), the author can validate that the 
application developed using the CVDeP was able to satisfy the application’s safety-critical 
latency requirement (≤200ms) in the field experiments.  
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Mobility Application  
The author evaluated the CVDeP using vehicle data for traffic operations 
applications. This application collects CVs’ data (e.g., BSMs) to support traffic operations, 
such as incident detection and localized traffic operational strategies (ARC-IT 2019). This 
application is divided into two sub-applications: (i) sub-application 1: collect real-time 
traffic data from mobile edges; (ii) sub-application 2: collect real-time traffic data from 
fixed edges.  The sub-application 1 runs in each fixed edge and sub-application 2 runs in 
the system edge.   
The author evaluated the scalability of the CVDeP to ensure the CV application 
requirements are met in terms of latency and throughput. Here, the latency is the time 
difference between the time of data generation at the edge-centric SC-CVT and the time 
when the data is received by the users (e.g., CV applications). Data delivery latency 
requirements for any mobility and environmental applications must be satisfied in order to 
provide mobility and environmental services. As the CVDeP aims to support different 
mobility and environmental applications, the author  considered 1000 ms as the maximum 
latency threshold to deliver the data from edge devices to the data consumers (e.g. CV 
applications) following the recommendations from (Ahmed-Zaid et al. 2011). This 1000 
ms will enable the near real-time operation of mobility applications, such as queue warning 
and traffic rerouting applications. However, if the latency recommendations changes in the 
future for any CV applications, the CVDeP can still be utilized by selecting appropriate 
underlying technologies for different communication and computing devices to meet any 
new requirements. The CVDeP provides a general architecture, which is independent of 
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specific technologies. Our experiments demonstrate the efficacies of the CVDeP as an 
application development platform using selected communication and computing 
technologies. Also, the author needed to ensure a high throughput (i.e., the data transfer 
rate), which means the high use of the allocated bandwidth. Our platform already satisfied 
the spatial requirement of the application, as mobile edges will be within the 
communication range of fixed edges. 
Evaluation Scenarios  
The author created two different scenarios for evaluating our application development 
platform by varying the number of fixed edges and the number of mobile edges.  
 Scenario 1: One system edge and one fixed edge with varying numbers of mobile 
edges (5, 10, 20, 30, 50, 100, 150, and 200).  
 Scenario 2: One system edge, varying number of fixed edges (1, 2, and 3), and 200 
mobile edges (CVs) for each fixed edge.  
For evaluation scenario 2, based on a fixed edge’s communication range, the maximum 
number of CVs on Perimeter road approaching the intersection is 200 vehicles/hour/lane 
during a congested traffic condition. For the evaluation in the emulated environment, the 
author used SUMO to generate the movement data of mobile edges and calibrated the 
traffic network so that traffic volume data from SUMO simulation matches, within a 
tolerance level of 5%, with the field-collected data. For both scenarios, the author evaluated 
the scalability of the application development platform in terms of data delivery latency 
and throughput. 
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Evaluation in Emulated Environment 
The author implemented a data collection and distribution system (a broker-based 
system) that is required for the real-time application development platform. The author 
evaluated the scalability of the CVDeP considering a data collection and distribution 
system, which is a broker-based system. In addition, the author compared the recorded end-
to-end latency with the latency requirement for the selected CV mobility application. As 
shown in Figure 2. 7 Evaluation of CVDeP for mobility application using application 
throughput and latency with the increasing number of mobile edge and fixed edge, the 
throughput of the broker-based system is linearly increasing and reaches a maximum at 5.2 
Mbits/s and 8.4 Mbits/sec, respectively. Higher throughput ensures reliable and scalable 
services. The broker-based system (e.g., Kafka (“Apache Kafka” n.d.) for this experiment) 
uses an asynchronous mode that can collect and distribute data in memory and send them 
in batches in a single shot (Kreps, Narkhede, and Rao 2011). Because of this asynchronous 
mode and sending data in batch, the broker-based system can provide the required 
throughput. The broker-based system can adapt the throughput requirement by the 
application as the number of mobile edges and fixed edge increases and thus can handle 
more data as needed.  
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Figure 2. 7 Evaluation of CVDeP for mobility application using application 
throughput and latency (Islam et al. 2020). 
 
The author observed that the CVDeP data collection and distribution system can 
maintain a lower latency with the increasing number of mobile edges and fixed edges. The 
increment of latency with the broker-based method is negligible for both scenarios 
(scenarios 1 and 2). The reason is that the broker-based system uses an intelligent ‘sendfile’ 
method with zero-copy optimization (i.e., sending the data directly to the consumer without 
any buffering or copying into memory) (“Apache Kafka” n.d.). Thus, the broker-based 
system can maintain a lower message delivery latency irrespective of the number of 
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producers and consumers thus ensuring scalability. In our experiment, the author  used the 
default configuration of a Kafka broker-based system (Kreps, Narkhede, and Rao 2011). 
However, the configuration (e.g., topic partitions, replication number, and the number of 
brokers) of Kafka's broker-based system can be configured easily to reduce the latency if 
the latency is higher than the CV application threshold. In addition, by adding additional 
data management brokers, as presented by (Du et al. 2018), the CVDeP can be scaled up 
to receive and share data from additional connected data sources (e.g., personal handheld 
devices, news media, and weather stations, traffic operators). 
Field Validation in SC-CVT  
The author evaluated the CVDeP in SC-CVT using five mobile edges (e.g., CVs) 
in the field experiment. Table 2. 2 Summary of Latency for Mobility Application with Five 
CVs. Table 2. 2 shows the summary of end-to-end latency when the author developed the 
application in the CVDeP emulated environment and SC-CVT. The author observed higher 
latency (maximum, average, and minimum) in the field than in the emulated environment. 
In the field experiment, the data exchange using DSRC technology between the mobile 
edges and fixed edges were affected by the environmental inferences, such as trees, 
roadway slope, and curvature. This causes a higher variation in latency in the field than in 
the emulated environment. However, the latency observed in the field was still far below 












End-to-End Latency Latency requirements 
for Mobility Application 
(U.S. Department of 







Maximum  115 ms 267 ms 
≤1000 ms Average  65 ms 69 ms 
Minimum  4 ms 6 ms 
Chapter Conclusions  
CV technology holds the promise of improving the traffic safety and efficiency of 
roadway traffic operations. In order to materialize CV benefits, the active participation of 
CV researchers and developers is necessary. This can be hindered due to the lack of real-
world application development platforms that use real-world and real-time data to support 
the CV application development process including testing and debugging. Our research 
related to the CV application development platform contributes directly by developing a 
CV application development platform, CVDeP, for an edge-centric CPS. Using the 
CVDeP, the CV application developers can interact with real-world edge devices, and 
develop, test, and debug CV safety and mobility applications. From our experiments, it was 
revealed that the applications developed using the CVDeP were able to satisfy the CV 
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safety and mobility application latency requirements and maintain the required throughput 
both for an increasing number of mobile edges and fixed edges. The author showed that 
the forward collision warning (FCW) application (a safety application) developed using 
the CVDeP can satisfy the safety-critical latency requirement (under 200 milliseconds for 
an FCW application). Also, the vehicle data for traffic operations application (a mobility 
application) developed using the CVDeP with a broker-based system shows about 400 
milliseconds of latency with three fixed edges and 600 mobile edges, which is much lower 
than the latency requirement (under 1000 milliseconds) of mobility applications. This 
proves the scalability of our CVDeP while satisfying the latency requirement of CV 
applications for an edge-centric CPS. The author published the source code of the CVDeP 
is released on the Github platform. 
As the CVDeP is being refined further, our follow-up studies of CVDeP includes 
(i) evaluation of the fault tolerance and resiliency of the platform; (ii) evaluation of multiple 
applications running simultaneously in multiple system edges, and merging information 
from diverse data sources of a large roadway network (i.e., data residing at local or 
city/county level, regional or state level, and/or national level); (iii) incorporation of data 
from other traditional data sources (e.g., traffic signals, video detectors or loop detectors) 
and non-traditional data sources (e.g., news media, weather sensors, social networking 
sites); and (iv) strategy identification to make the system more secure by incorporating 
different security threat detection and protection mechanisms against different malicious 





HYBRID QUANTUM-CLASSICAL NEURAL NETWORK FOR CLOUD-
SUPPORTED IN-VEHICLE CYBERATTACK DETECTION 
 
Introduction 
A classical computer works with ones and zeros, whereas a quantum computer uses 
ones, zeros, and superpositions of ones and zeros, which enables quantum computers to 
perform a vast number of calculations simultaneously compared to classical computers. In 
a cloud-supported Internet-of-Things (IoT) environment, running a machine learning 
application in quantum computers is often difficult, due to the existing limitations of the 
current quantum devices. However, with the combination of quantum-classical neural 
networks (NN), complex and high-dimensional features can be extracted by the classical 
NN to a reduced but more informative feature space to be processed by the existing 
quantum computers. In this study, the author develops a hybrid quantum-classical NN to 
detect an amplitude shift cyber-attack on an in-vehicle control area network (CAN) dataset. 
The author shows that using the hybrid quantum-classical NN, it is possible to achieve an 
attack detection accuracy of 90%, which is higher than a comparable classical NN (61%) 
alone or quantum NN alone (62%).   
The decoherence and mechanical errors in quantum computers can make it harder 
for the existing quantum computers to learn the underlying data pattern, affecting the 
performance (Kulkarni, Kulkarni, and Pant 2020). With the recent advancement of near-
term quantum processors, it is possible to use a combination of classical and quantum 
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computers to reduce errors. In a hybrid quantum-classical setup some computations are 
performed in quantum computers and some computations are performed in classical 
computers. Such a setup can be used in a cloud-based internet-of-things (IoT) environment, 
where a control area network (CAN) bus is connected to the cloud using a CAN logger 
attached to the OBD-II port of a vehicle. The CAN logger provides CAN bus data to the 
cloud to run multiple IoT applications in the cloud while meeting the delay requirements 
(e.g., data upload and download delay) of the vehicle’s operation (Figure 3. 1) (Nkenyereye 
and Jang 2017)(Deng et al. 2020). In this chapter, the hybrid quantum-classical cyberattack 
detection application will run in the cloud to detect a cyberattack on the in-vehicle CAN 
bus. The author considers an amplitude shift cyberattack, where an attacker can 
compromise an electronic control unit (ECU) locally or remotely and can perform an 
amplitude shift attack on the in-vehicle CAN bus (M. Chowdhury, Islam, and Khan 2019). 
As the amplitude shift attack changes the data field of a CAN frame randomly, the complex 
nature of the attack makes it difficult to detect this kind of attack. Studies showed that CAN 
bus used in existing vehicles do not have sufficient security features (Khan et al. 2020) 
(Song, Woo, and Kim 2020), and the security can be improved using machine learning 
techniques. The study by Song et al. shows an accuracy of 99% in detecting denial of 
service (DoS) attacks. However, their method will not work in the case of an amplitude 
shift attack, where the amplitude of a feature is shifted (up or down) randomly. The recent 
study by Khan et al. shows a detection accuracy of 87% on detecting amplitude shift attack 
using a deep neural network (Khan et al. 2020). To improve the attack detection accuracy, 
the author combines a quantum machine learning method, more specifically a quantum 
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neural network, with a classical neural network. By leveraging the advantages of the near-
term quantum computers, the study by Farhi & Neven presented a general quantum neural 
network architecture that was able to classify a handwritten digit dataset (i.e., MNIST) 
(Broughton et al. 2020)(Farhi and Neven 2018). However, using such a quantum-only 
approach yields a lower classification accuracy. A more recent study shows the use of a 
hybrid quantum-classical neural network (NN) approach can achieve a higher classification 
accuracy (Mari et al. 2020). However, this approach has not been applied in a cloud-based 
in-vehicle cyberattack detection system. Using a cloud-based hybrid quantum-classical 
NN, the author overcomes the existing limitations of quantum computers, and develop a 
quantum computing application for in-vehicle cyberattack detection.   
 
Figure 3. 1 Cloud based In-vehicle Cyberattack Detection System 
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Cyberattack Detection in IoT Cloud 
In our hybrid quantum-classical NN (Figure 3. 2), first, the author  preprocess the 
in-vehicle CAN bus dataset and construct a CAN image dataset (Song, Woo, and Kim 
2020). Then the author performs feature extraction using classical convolution neural 
network (CNN), convert the output from the classical CNN into quantum data, and use the 
quantum data into a quantum NN to detect an in-vehicle cyberattack.  
 
Figure 3. 2 Hybrid quantum-classical neural network. 
 
Preparing dataset 
The author constructs a 13 × 13 CAN image from 13 consecutive CAN frames, 
where each row represents a single CAN frame and each column represents a data feature. 
The author  considers a 13 × 13  CAN image as the author  has 13 data features in our 
dataset (Khan et al. 2020). The constructed CAN image dataset is represented by 𝐷 =
{(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖)}𝑖=1
𝑁 , where 𝑥𝑖 is a 13 × 13  CAN image, with a label 𝑦𝑖 ∈ {0,1} representing no 
attack and attack image. 𝑁 is the number of total samples in 𝐷. The author divides the total 
samples of, 𝑁=6000 into 80% training dataset (i.e., 4800 samples) and 20% testing dataset 
(i.e.,1200 samples).    
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Feature extraction using classical neural network  
As presented in (Song, Woo, and Kim 2020), the author  also uses a CNN for 
extracting the features from a 13 × 13 CAN image and produce a 4 × 4 reduced image. 
The feature extraction from CNN can be represented as follows: 
𝐿4𝑥4 = 𝐿𝑛−1 ○ 𝐿𝑛−2 ○ 𝐿𝑛−3 … . 𝐿𝑛1 ○ 𝐿𝑛0 
𝐿𝑖: 𝑥𝑖−1 → 𝑥𝑖 =  𝜑(𝑊𝑖𝑥𝑖−1 + 𝑏𝑖) 
Where, 𝐿4𝑥4 is the output of a CNN, 𝐿𝑖 is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ layer of the CNN; 𝑥𝑖−1 and 𝑥𝑖 are the 
input and output vectors of 𝐿𝑖; 𝑊𝑖 is the weight, 𝑏𝑖 is a bias vector and 𝜑 is a nonlinear 
function. Hyperparameters, such as number of layers(𝑛), 𝑊𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 are optimized during 
the training phase on the training dataset for accurate classification.  
Quantum encoding 
To perform quantum operations (e.g., unitary operations, such as rotation, and 
phase flip of qubits) on each 𝐿4𝑥4 image, the author needs to convert the classical data into 








Where, |𝜑〉 is an encoded quantum basis, where the basis |0〉 represents normal data and 
|+1〉 represents attack data, 𝑏𝑖 is a binary value for each data point of a 𝐿4𝑥4 image produced 
using binary thresholding with a value of 0.5. Figure 3. 3 shows the output after the data is 
encoded into quantum binary image data.  
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Figure 3. 3 Quantum encoded binary data.  
 
Classification using quantum neural network  
With quantum encoded data, the author trains the parameterized quantum NN 
(Broughton et al. 2020). The parameterized quantum NN performs unitary operations, such 
as rotation, phase flip, on qubits and can be represented as follows:  
𝑄 = 𝑄𝑑−1 ○ 𝑄𝑑−2 … 𝑄1 ○ 𝑄0 
𝑄𝑖: |𝜑〉 → 𝑦 =  𝑈(𝑤)|𝜑〉 
Where 𝑄 is a binary output with {0,1}, where 0 and 1 represent no attack and attack 
detected, respectively; 𝑄 has 𝑑 number of layers,  𝑈(𝑤) is a unitary operation on |𝜑〉 with 
a weight 𝑤, and 𝑦 is the output after performing the unitary operation 𝑈(𝑤).   
Experimental Results 
The author compares the performance of the hybrid quantum-classical NN (Figure 
3. 2) with the or classical NN alone (Figure 3. 4) and quantum NN alone (Figure 3. 5). For 
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a fair comparison, the author selected the equivalent hyperparameters for each type of NN 
(Table 3. 1).  
 
Figure 3. 4 Compareable classical neural network. 
 
 
Figure 3. 5 Compareable quantum only neural network 
 
Figure 3. 6 shows the attack detection accuracy on the training dataset and testing 
dataset. For both the training and testing dataset the hybrid quantum-classical NN shows 
93% and 90% accuracy, respectively, whereas the quantum-only NN (Farhi and Neven 
2018) shows 84%, and 62% accuracy on the training dataset and testing dataset, 
respectively. With the classical NN (Song, Woo, and Kim 2020), the attack detection 
accuracy is 59% and 61% on the training and testing dataset, respectively. Here, the 
classical NN-based feature extractor was able to extract the features and the quantum NN 
was able to perform more accurate attack detection. The feature map extracted from the 
classical NNs, CNN in this case, allowed the parameterized quantum NN to explore the 
neighboring features in an exponentially large linear space, potentially allowing our 
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hybrid-classical NN to capture the patterns in the dataset (i.e., statistical distributions) more 
efficiently than classical NN alone and quantum NN alone.  








Number of qubits 6 6 N/A 
Number of epochs 20 20 20 
Number of layers 3 3 5 
Batch size 32 32 32 
Total trainable parameters 24 24 24 
 
 


























Training dataset Testing dataset
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Chapter Conclusions 
In a cloud-supported IoT environment, a hybrid-classical neural network performs 
better in detecting an in-vehicle cyberattack compared to a quantum neural network, and a 
classical neural network, as a hybrid-quantum neural network, can capture the complex 
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